Ukraine peace plan

Donald Trump’s Ukraine peace plan in November 2025 illustrates differences in opinion between foreign policy realists and those who cling to Utopian visions of justice.  The need for realism in foreign policy, in the absence of an effective rules-based world order, is a topic analysed in the PatternsofPower books (6.7.7.4).

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s initial reaction to the plan highlights his problem: he said that Ukraine “might face a very difficult choice: either losing dignity, or risk losing a key partner”, adding that “today is one of the most difficult moments in our history”.  Donald Trump had given Ukraine a week to accept the plan, saying that Zelensky would “have to like” it, adding that otherwise Ukraine and Russia would continue fighting.

The following analysis puts the case for realism in this situation.

Key aspects of the plan

Reuters published a leaked version of the draft 28-point Ukraine peace plan on 21^st November.  Axios had earlier published some initial analysis which is quoted below:

●  “The two thorniest issues in the Ukraine talks up to now have been who will control what territory once the war is over, and how Ukraine can be assured that Russia won’t simply resume the war at a later date.”

●  Ukraine is being asked to cede control of the 14.5% of the Donbas that Russia has not yet conquered.

●  “the plan also included limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military and on its long-range weapons in return for U.S. security guarantees.”

The plan prohibits Ukraine from joining NATO, but encourages it to join the EU, whilst reintegrating Russia into the global economy and the G8.  The global economy would benefit.

It envisages investment in Ukraine’s economy with America receiving a share of the profits.

Ukraine will forfeit the US security guarantee if it attacks Russia.

If Russia attacks Ukraine there will be a “robust coordinated military response” and “all global sanctions will be restored”.

Condemnation of the plan

The Telegraph characterised The recurring nightmare of Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine as “American agreement to Russia-friendly terms for resolving the war in Ukraine”, negotiated secretly without Ukraine’s involvement.

“Britain and most European countries recoil from this possibility, not because they are opposed to peace or obdurately against any concessions, but for the simple reason that if Putin is given a large measure of what he wants, he will inevitably come back for more and launch yet another blood-soaked invasion of Ukraine in the years ahead.

…Mr Zelensky would, in effect, be compelled to relinquish thousands of square miles which his soldiers have doggedly defended at immense cost. He would be required to sacrifice the fortresses in the unoccupied areas of the Donetsk region that protect the rest of Ukraine.

And, most grievously of all, Mr Zelensky would have to hand over hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian people who live in these towns and villages to an enemy that murders the men, rapes the women and kidnaps the children.”

The Economist argued that Donald Trump’s peace plan would be bad for Ukraine, Europe and America: “It is a sad mix of naked opportunism and strategic myopia”.  It criticises Trump’s attempt to make money out of the situation.  It argues that Ukraine would be inadequately defended and that “the plan richly rewards Mr Putin’s aggression”.  It concludes, though, that both Ukraine and Europe should work with the plan to avoid antagonising America.

The realist viewpoint

Anatol Lieven is a realist.  He described Trump’s ’28-Point Plan’ as “a necessary step toward ending the war”.  He makes some valid points:

●  “with the key Ukrainian town of Pokrovsk seemingly close to falling, the Trump administration apparently believes that the rest of the Donbas is sooner or later bound to fall too, and there is no point in losing more Ukrainian lives in a vain attempt to keep it, and also risk Ukrainian military collapse and losing more territory beyond the Donbas.”

●  “Predictably, the leaked plan has drawn immediate denunciation from both Ukrainian and Western sources, with it being described as a demand for Ukraine’s “capitulation.” This is mistaken. As the Quincy Institute has long pointed out, an agreement that leaves three quarters of Ukraine independent and with a path to EU membership would in fact be a Ukrainian victory, albeit a qualified one.” It does not satisfy Russia’s “maximalist demands”.

●  “Certain Western officials, politicians, and commentators believe, and have stated openly, that keeping the Ukraine War going is “money well spent” because it weakens Russia without sacrificing U.S. lives. But apart from the deep immorality of sacrificing Ukrainian lives for this goal, the longer the war goes on the greater the risk that Ukraine will suffer a far greater defeat, Russia a far greater victory, and the U.S. a far greater humiliation.”

Safeguards for Ukraine

Trump’s Ukraine peace plan is only legitimate if it achieves Ukraine’s need for a strong security guarantee against Russia invading again.  As Anatol Lieven pointed out, it would be possible to negotiate this within the scope of the published plan:

●  “Western economic sanctions should be not ended but suspended, with a snapback clause stating that they will automatically resume if Russia resumes aggression;”

●  “designated long-range missiles and other arms can be stockpiled with a legally binding guarantee that they will be provided to Ukraine if Russia restarts the war.”

The second point is very relevant, given that Ukraine has a deal with France for the supply of 100 Rafael jets over a period of 10 years for example.  Ukraine will get stronger over time if its allies keep their word and gradually accumulate a supply of military equipment.

Another point (not highlighted by Lieven) is that the US will have financial interests in maintaining the peaceful reconstruction of Ukraine.  This will help Trump to get US support for the plan.

Reuters has reported that Western leaders say Ukraine plan needs work, Trump signals scope for changes.  They’re trying to protect Kyiv and avoid angering Trump.

Summary

The logical argument for working with the plan is compelling:

●  The killing would stop. “In total there have been 53,006 civilian casualties, including 14,534 deaths, since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022” according to a UN News report on 12 November 2025.  There are more deaths reported almost every day.

●  The military death toll for both sides is a closely guarded secret, but an Encyclopaedia Britannica report in November 2025 cited figures produced by Western intelligence officials: more than 380,000 Russian military and Wagner group casualties in the first two years (dead and wounded), and that “Ukraine had suffered perhaps 200,000 military casualties”.

●  That report also noted “the forcible transfer of between 900,000 and 1.6 million Ukrainian citizens (including some 260,000 children) to Russian territory”. The peace plan includes the establishment of a humanitarian committee overseeing the return of these people (point 28).

●  A just resolution to the conflict is not realistically possible. Justice would require the restitution of Ukrainian land, payment of reparations and prosecution of war crimes.  Russia is slowly gaining territory, though, albeit at an enormous cost to itself.  And China is committed to ensuring that Russia does not lose the war.  The war could continue indefinitely.

●  Trump’s plan offers something to all the participants. Putin would be able to sell it to the Russian population as a victory, and that is essential if he is to be persuaded to stop fighting. Ukraine would get its security guarantee, and Zelensky needs to persuade the Ukrainian population that future peace depends upon accepting such a plan (suitably modified).

Trump’s proposed Ukraine Peace Plan is unjust, but it is better than continuing the war.  It needs modification.  Peace in Europe will depend on European assistance to Ukraine, and it would be stronger if America remains supportive.