Identity Politics

(This is a current page, from the Patterns of Power Edition 3 book contents.  An archived copy of this page is held at https://www.patternsofpower.org/edition03/6742.htm)

The term  ‘identity politics’ in this book is used to describe situations where people’s participation in politics is driven primarily by their ethnicity, rather than by a political ideology. Francis Fukuyama, in an article Against Identity Politics: The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy, described how it “focuses people’s natural demand for recognition of their dignity and provides language for expressing the resentments that arise when such recognition is not forthcoming”.

Voting on the basis of ethnicity offers people the safety valve of knowing that their cultural identity is visible, but it has the disadvantage of potentially exacerbating divisiveness by incentivising politicians to emphasise differences or ‘play the race card’.  The political system becomes focused on negotiation by proxy between ethnic groups and the population is no longer directly guiding government policy in what was described earlier as ‘joystick’ politics (

If there has been a history of conflict and lack of trust between ethnic groups they have no good basis for negotiating policy – they tend to posture and jockey for position rather than focus on the need to find collective solutions to the country’s problems.[1]  The friction can easily turn to violence, such as the “war, destruction and poverty” described in a BBC article entitled Yugoslavia: 1918–2003.

People seek solidarity with others in the same group if they perceive threats (  Some politicians exploit this phenomenon to gain support by fomenting hostility.  Even if there are no recognised ethnic political parties as such, there are several techniques which politicians commonly use to stimulate people’s sense of identity as a means of gaining support:

  • Hostility towards immigrants can form the basis of a politician’s attempt to win support from the existing inhabitants of an area, by drawing attention to issues noted in the previous section (
  • People’s unfamiliarity with foreign cultures can enable immigrants to be demonised as a threat to national identity by ‘alt-right’ politicians ( As quoted in a Guardian article, Nigel Farage’s anti-migrant poster reported to police, a UKIP poster was described as a “blatant attempt to incite racial hatred” and showed a “similarity to Nazi propaganda footage of migrants shown in a BBC documentary from 2005”.
  • Leaders can proclaim threats to a group’s freedom, status or security. Jinnah stimulated such fears among Muslims in India, for example, as Britain was granting it independence; his “Direct Action Day” against the Hindu majority, in August 1946, resulted in 4,000 deaths and 10,000 people injured in Calcutta.[2]
  • Religious labels can be attached to existing political movements. The Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ were a prime example.  As characterised in a BBC article, The Troubles, “The goal of the unionist and overwhelmingly Protestant majority was to remain part of the United Kingdom. The goal of the nationalist and republican, almost exclusively Catholic, minority was to become part of the Republic of Ireland. This was a territorial conflict, not a religious one”.
  • Appeals to national identity can be used to mobilise people to take revenge for, or to ‘correct’, a past injustice. Serbia’s invasion of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, for example, was politically linked to a desire to reverse its defeat in 1389 by the Ottoman Turks – as reported by Der Spiegel in an article The Curse of National Grievance.
  • Old religious disputes can be similarly re-awakened for political purposes. For example, in 1992 the Hindu nationalist BJP argued that the 16th-century Babri Masjid mosque at Ayodhya had been built on the birthplace of the Hindu god-king Ram; this whipped up a frenzy of anti-Muslim feeling which resulted in the destruction of the mosque.  As reported in an Economist article, The mosque at Ayodhya, senior leaders of the BJP were “complicit in the vandalism” and “some 2,000 people died” in the ensuing violence.
  • Acts of political provocation can make a group feel good at the expense of its opponents, as in the example of Northern Ireland’s Protestants: a BBC article, Q&A: Orange marches, reported that “people see the parades as intimidatory and designed to raise tensions”; riots regularly ensued.

As shown in several of these examples, identity politics can easily escalate to violence.  Large-scale dissent can lead to separatist pressures (6.6.3).

An authoritarian government has two advantages, compared to a democracy, in reducing the risk of identity politics:

  • Politicians in an authoritarian system are less dependent upon short-term popularity, so they have less motivation to ‘play the race card’.
  • There are no political mechanisms for one group to gain ascendancy over another, so it is less tempting to indulge in identity politics.

These arguments do not in themselves constitute a reason for preferring authoritarianism as a system, but they can contribute to the legitimacy of authoritarian governments in countries where there would otherwise be a risk of identity politics.



[1] Claude Louche found that “negotiation is not an alternative to intergroup conflict; it is one of the forms in which conflict is expressed.”  This quotation appeared in p.  14 of Henri Tajfel’s paper Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, where he gave the attribution as: Louche, C.  Open conflict and the dynamics of intergroup negotiations.  The paper was available in July 2018 at http://web.comhem.se/u52239948/08/tajfel86.pdf.

[2] Yasmin Khan described the events of the Calcutta riots, and the context in which they took place, in her book The Great Partition, chap. 4 pp. 63-6.  In December 2018 the book could be previewed at http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_great_Partition.html?id=i9WdQp2pwOYC&redir_esc=y and “Calcutta riots” could be entered as a search term.