9.6   Meeting Governance Requirements

(This is an archived extract from the book Patterns of Power: A Rough Guide)

In this book the term ‘acceptability’ (2.3) has been used to define people's satisfaction with their governance and as what gives a State legitimacy (6.3.5).  As Michael Oakeshott wrote:

“The authority of the state is not mere government and law, nor is it founded upon a contract or any other form of the consent of the people, but resides solely in the completeness of the satisfaction which the state itself affords to the needs of concrete persons.” [1]

There is no 'contract' as such with the State, but there is a set of mutual expectations that amounts to one.  The State expects people to comply with its governance and the population expects the governance to be acceptable. Some, necessarily subjective, criteria for good governance were suggested at the start of this book (2.1) and some of the patterns of power can be used to satisfy these requirements:

1.    National law protects people from physical threats within most countries (5.2.5); and depoliticised international law would improve security between countries (9.4).  Collaborative action is needed to counter environmental threats (3.5.7), and some political action is already being taken (6.7.5).

2.    People’s freedom and opportunity to flourish depends upon them having a basic “capability set” (4.2.4), some economic freedom (3.5.9), freedom of belief (4.4.1), and the freedom to influence their governance (6.8.3). 

3.    A society can be cohesive with economic inclusiveness (6.7.2), supportive interpersonal relationships (4.3.2) and peaceful pluralism (9.3). Everyone can feel that they have a stake in society, and that it is in their interests to support it, if they can have citizenship and it is of value to them (6.7.3). 

4.    Any level of government can provide public services and infrastructure if it is able to raise money from taxation and allocate funding for such purposes (6.7.1).  Even if these are provided by private companies (3.5.3), politicians can ensure that they are competently managed by a combination of political oversight (6.6.2) and delegated powers (5.3.2).

5.    The acceptability of economic governance depends upon a combination of economic growth, economic justice and the impact of economic activity on society (3.1.1).  The major subjects requiring economic negotiation are listed at the end of the economic analysis structure (3.1.4) and the details are at the end of that chapter (3.5).  The meaningfulness of these negotiations mostly depends upon the political system.  Competent economic management can be encouraged by providing transparency and accountability (6.8.5).

6.    It is within the scope of the Legal Dimension (5.1.3) to define the rules, such as a Constitution, which control the behaviour of those who are appointed to positions of authority (5.2.3).  Such rules can be enforced if there is a clear separation of legal powers (5.2.8).

7.    Negotiability is necessary for leadership responsiveness (9.2).

8.    Politicians are more likely to act in the public interest if there is transparency and accountability (6.8.5).  Measures may be necessary to combat corruption (7.2.5).

9.    If people are dissatisfied, an election can result in replacement of the political leadership in a democracy.  There may be doubts about the legitimacy of an authoritarian government because the people themselves don’t have a formal mechanism for changing a leadership that they are dissatisfied with, though in some systems politicians can be replaced by a ‘selectorate’ on the basis of poor performance (6.3.1).  Limits to tenure are a safeguard in any system (6.3.4).

10. There are ways of enabling people to make choices within a framework of governance: consumers can spend their disposable income as they choose (3.2.2), a choice of public services can be offered (3.5.3), the law can avoid unnecessarily constraining moral choices (5.4.4), politicians can be elected in a democratic political system (6.3.2), and freedom of belief can be guaranteed (6.7.4.5).  All governance places constraints on individual liberty – reflecting people’s obligations to others in any society – but any government should limit itself to the provision of services and the enforcement of people’s obligations to each other (9.2).

11. A policy of inclusivity can ensure that everyone is treated equally in all four dimensions of governance, regardless of race, creed, gender, sexual orientation, age, wealth or education:

·     All ethnic groups can be given equal treatment within peaceful pluralism (9.3).

·     Equality of economic opportunity (but not equality of outcomes) requires some socio-economic rights (4.2.4). 

·     It is possible, but politically contentious, to take measures to reduce economic inequality (6.7.2).

12. Human rights are an explicit agreement on standards of behaviour and on the entitlements that a society wishes to grant to its citizens (4.2.4).  These rights can be guaranteed to everyone in the society to some extent:

·     The law can be used to protect human rights (5.4.7).

·     Socio-economic rights can be politically guaranteed (6.7.1).

·     The freedom to influence political governance, including freedom of speech, is itself a right and is a safeguard to protect other rights (6.8.3).

·     In many countries it is possible for people to appeal to multinational or global jurisdiction on human rights, to protect themselves against politicians who abuse their powers (6.3.7).

This summary indicates that it is possible to meet all the criteria for good governance which were suggested at the start of this book (2.1). 

Countries vary in whether they include all these criteria, in how they define them and what weighting to give them – there is no universal ‘right answer’ for any aspect of governance.  Readers of this book will similarly vary.  This book’s method of assessing the acceptability of governance is offered as a contribution towards the negotiations required to improve it.

 



[1] Michael Oakeshott, The Authority of the State, from Religion, Politics and the Moral Life, p.87.