9.5.2 Reforming the UN

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There is a need for more predefined law and less dependence on politicians making decisions on the basis of short-term national interests (6.6.4.2). The dynamic decision-making of the UN €“ where the Security Council acts as legislature, judge and enforcer €“ is unsound from a legal perspective (5.3.6.1). It would be better to have a clear separation of powers (5.2.8), which might look like the concept which is illustrated here:

The institutions would need to be strengthened for this concept to be workable. Each of the elements of the diagram needs clarification:

· The UN Security Council could act as the executive under a separation of powers but it needs to be able to negotiate meaningfully, in the terminology of this book:

? It should be more clearly representative of the world€™s population (6.6.6.2). Its legitimacy is currently undermined by being unbalanced in favour of the Western powers. It can be argued that Europe should have only one seat.

? Vetoes are currently being misused. They are the antithesis of inclusive negotiation and should only be applicable in a few tightly-specified situations. One option is to require 2 vetoes to block a resolution. This would prevent Russia from shielding Syria, for example, and also prevent America from shielding Israel €“ which would probably be in the latter's best interests, since its internal politics sometimes prevent it from taking the wisest course.

? Security Council members who defy the UN should be accountable. Perhaps they should lose their seats for a period, say from 6 months to 5 years, depending upon the seriousness of the breach. The International Court of Justice might be an appropriate body to determine the sentence.

· There is already enough international law to form the basis of a legal framework, but it is insufficient (5.3.6.4). It is suggested here that the UN Security Council could make requests for legislation as and when it is able to agree upon them. There are several possibilities:

? There is scope for eventually extending the Rome Statute, by establishing agreed rights as maturity develops. This could be achieved progressively. As Ronald Dworkin commented, it would be necessary to disentangle rights from political ideals: to establish which are the €œbaseline€ rights that should be enforced by the international community, which rights are principles or recommendations, and which rights remain aspirational.[1]

? The scope of the €˜Responsibility to Protect€™ (5.3.7) might then be widened and given legal status (without requiring case-by-case UN Resolutions) to protect human rights in countries whose leadership has ceased to work for the benefit of their citizens or to protect their minority groups.

· The UN General Assembly could act as a legislature in a new legislative process, perhaps using voting rules which would allow countries€™ votes to be partially weighted for population size.

· Approved legislation would need to clarify the rules on aggression against other countries, and violations of €œbaseline€ human rights, so that politicians know the rules before they commit crimes.

· A court is the appropriate body to decide whether the rules have been breached or not and agreeing whether proposed enforcement actions are appropriate. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was formed for that purpose (5.3.6.2), so supporting it is a priority. There is also scope for increased use of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for arbitration on territorial disputes (7.3.1) and on cross-border legal issues (5.3.4).

· Any member of the UN Security Council should be able, without needing the agreement of other members, to refer cases to the existing ICC Prosecutor€™s Office.[2]

· Decisions to prosecute should be based on legal considerations rather than political bargaining. The ICC determines whether it has to act or whether national courts can deal with an issue.

· As with other courts, if the case is proven the court would decide upon an appropriate sentence €“ which for an international court might mean authorising the punishment of individuals or, in some cases, military intervention.

· As at present, the UN Security Council would have to decide what enforcement resources to use €“ e.g. Interpol, NATO, Russia, China, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), or national forces. It is also part of the Executive€™s enforcement role to agree measures for crime prevention.

This proposal differs from the current process mainly in that decisions to proceed on breaches of security would be taken by the ICC, not by the UN Security Council. Enforcement of ICC decisions would be guaranteed, so that would-be law-breakers cannot try and play one Security Council member off against another €“ as Saddam Hussein did for so long.[3]

This framework of international law would need increased funding, which would have to be negotiated with all the countries concerned, but this should be more than offset by savings in national defence budgets. It might also be desirable to reimburse the enforcers for the costs they incur, which would further increase the required funding but would enable costs to be shared more equitably than at present.