9.2.4        Individual Responsibilities

 (The latest version of this page is at Pattern Descriptions.  An archived copy of this page is held at https://www.patternsofpower.org/edition02/924.htm)

In this book it is argued that freedom of the individual is important, but that it has to be accompanied by responsibilities.  As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 29) states, “everyone has duties to the community”.  The ‘Harm Principle’ needs to be restated:

People should be as free as possible, subject to them not harming anyone else and meeting their obligations to society.[1] 

An individual’s obligations to society include compliance with its agreed governance, both written and unwritten.  These obligations can be analysed in all five dimensions of power:

·      People should contribute towards the cost of publicly-funded services and socio-economic rights by paying their taxes.  If people were allowed to withhold tax (3.2.4.4) for projects and services they did not agree with, others would have to pay more.

·      Taxpayers are entitled to demand that those who claim publically-funded benefits are genuinely in need and are not just ‘free-riding’.

·      The law can protect people against harm inflicted by others.  It can only do so if most people voluntarily obey it, so there is a matching obligation upon the legislature to ensure that the law is acceptable to as many people as possible (5.4.3).

·      People should behave with consideration towards others:

      At a minimum they should exhibit socially-acceptable behaviour – showing respect, courtesy and integrity (4.4.2).

      If they can, they should avoid a self-inflicted need to be helped by others, whether by recklessness or by idleness. 

      For those who have the necessary means, refusal to pay health insurance places a burden upon everyone else – because no-one can stand idly by and watch someone else die for lack of a small sum of money.

·      People mostly have to accept the outcome of the political process (6.8.6), although they can continue to press for change.  Governments have a matching obligation to allow free speech, including protests, so that criticism can be expressed (6.8.3.2).

·      Stable governance depends upon individuals not trying to undermine it or overthrow it.  Putting pressure on a government to make changes is a necessary part of politics (6.4.2.1), and is a way of preserving the stability of a society.  If people-power becomes excessively violent though, particularly if it inflicts physical harm on other people, it tips over into an infringement of the rights of others.  There is a difficult balance to be struck.  Refusal to negotiate is the subject of a later section (9.6).

These obligations, whilst they might appear to be constraints on personal freedom, are necessary to guarantee the freedom of others and to underpin the well-being of society as a whole.  The chaos that results from failure to comply with agreed governance results in the lack of everyone’s freedom to live as they choose, so it is rational to agree to restrain one’s self-interest to preserve collective benefit (2.3.2).

Freedom isn’t only the license to do what one wants.  Freedom for the disadvantaged members of society depends upon them having sufficient socio-economic entitlements to live with dignity (6.7.2.3) and to have a chance of competing fairly to gain a better standard of living.  And freedom for the successful to retain their earnings depends upon the State restricting itself to the minimum scope necessary to grant a fair opportunity to the less successful (9.2.2).  A society which fails to be fair to both rich and poor will eventually tear itself apart, as history has repeatedly shown; the French and Russian Revolutions are obvious examples. 

© PatternsofPower.org, 2014



[1] This addition of “obligations to society” to the Harm Principle can be considered as an extended implementation of the concept of “samaritanism”, as described by Christopher H. Wellman in Liberalism, Samaritanism, and Political Legitimacy.  Wellman argues that “what ultimately legitimizes a state's imposition upon your liberty is not merely the services it provides you, but the benefits it provides others” [his emphasis].  A copy of this article was available in April 2014 from http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/WELLMANlibsam.pdf, subject to JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, which are available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp.