6.7.7.1  Seeking National Advantage by Coercion

(This is an archived extract from the book Patterns of Power: Edition 2)

Populations have come to expect their governments to try, ‘in the national interest’, to influence the behaviour of other countries.  For example Madeleine Albright, an American Secretary of State, described the purpose of foreign policy as to “persuade other countries to do what we want”,[1] and the neoconservative Project for a New American Century stated its requirement for:

"…a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities".[2]

Politicians have at least three ways of exercising coercion, either with or without formal international agreement:

·      They can use economic inducements and sanctions, as already described (3.3.7.2); these work to everybody’s economic disadvantage and they are of questionable effectiveness.

·      They can use military power (7.4.1) or threats (7.4.2), as described in the next chapter; these are also of limited utility.

·      Purely political coercion can take the form of offering concessions, or refusing to co-operate, in international negotiations – on economic and environmental matters for example.

When such coercion is in breach of international protocol, it is a form of Self-Protection (7.2.7.3), leading to adverse political consequences:

·      Coercion undermines the legitimacy of those who use it.  There is no agreed or established right whereby one country may exercise any form of dominion over another, irrespective of their relative sizes and military strength.

·      When members of the Security Council undermine the UN by misusing their vetoes, they also undermine their own legitimacy.  For example, America’s support of Israel on the Security Council (6.6.6.2) reduces its credibility with Israel's Arab neighbours.

·      Coercion strengthens the target country by giving its leaders a form of political legitimacy (6.3.6), enabling them to call for domestic unity to resist the threat.

·      There are risks in trying to prop up an unpopular incumbent government – as America did in the 1960s and 1970s with the Shah of Iran for example.[3]  When the propped-up government finally falls there is less likelihood of future cooperation with that country; Iran still refers to America as “Great Satan USA”.[4]

·      The unilateral exercise of power is not impartial.  Western interventions have been badly received by other parts of the world:

“…the cumulative effect is terrible, chiefly because it looks so selective. When the West worries about oil, weapons of mass destruction, or terrorism, it finds a high-sounding excuse to do what it wants. When it can’t be bothered to intervene (Darfur, Zimbabwe, Burma) or has useful but nasty allies (Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan) it pleads realpolitik. That characterisation is unfair, but many people, particularly in Russia, find it all too convincing.” [5]

The result has been a diminution of the West’s influence.

·      Countries which use war as an instrument of policy will be judged by all the criteria of a 'just war' (4.3.5.5); those who are seen to have breached those guidelines have impaired their future relationships with other countries.[6]

·      Future co-operation becomes much less likely, with the country which is being coerced and with countries which aren’t involved.

Any apparent short-term political gains, from the use of coercion, are rapidly offset by what other countries see as a misuse of power. 

© PatternsofPower.org, 2014